Categorie: Grondstoffen

Aims to update investors on developments in the world of strategy metals – crucial inputs to industry, defense and technology innovation

Terence van der Hout                    
Nov 13 – 19, 2011 Gold&Discovery Fund

The 7th Hong Kong Rare Earth Conference was a packed affair, and a changed presentation line-up and attendance crowd underlined the road to adulthood the REE industry is currently undergoing. Presentors now came from various industry end-users, research and innovation labs, and China, as opposed to the usual weste gurus and junior hopefuls that line the Canadian shows. A number of myths were busted, others upheld, and forecasts and developments in the various segments of REE applications were more detailed and granular. I will review a number of interesting speeches over the next few bulletins. This week I will focus on the opening presentation by Constantine Karayannopoulos, CEO of Neo Material Technologies (NEM.T).

Neo Material Technologies
Neo Material is a major processor of rare earth materials, producing 85% of the Chinese market for the all-important magnetic powders. These powders are used to make high performance magnets which in tu are input to all hard discs, mobile phones, automobiles and various green tech innovations such as wind turbines etc. The rare earth industry is said to be driven primarily by magnets. Neo Material Technologies (as well as its European counterpart Rhodia) is therefore at the heart of the rare earth industry, and comments from the company are generally worth listening to. Mr. Karayannopoulos went on a myth-busting tour and made a number of interesting comments on developments in the markets.

Myth number 1
Myth number one is the generally accepted truth that China’s low cost production in rare earths that drove out inteational competitors at the beginning of the millennium was due primarily to its dismal environmental regulation and low labour costs. In fact, China’s environmental regulations are stricter than almost anywhere else in the world, and the standards themselves are not an issue. It is in the enforcement that things are going wrong in China, and this makes me wonder if the increased recent regulation in terms of invoice systems, production quotas, attempts at price controls, centralization, and five year investment and innovation targets that are sending shivers down the spines of free market adherents are going to be effective if the same level of commitment is not given to enforcement. There are no free markets in rare earths, as readers probably know by now, and I guess rigid and expensive enforcement is a necessary burden on those seeking to monopolize.

Mr. Karayannopoulos believes that it is particularly the fiercely competitive nature of the numerous inteal domestic REE operations that has lowered costs in China over the years. Also, given the by-product nature of rare earths at Bayan Obo (the largest rare earth mine in the world is primarily an iron mine), production of rare earths is virtually free because capital expenditures and operational expenditures are boe by the iron production. How do you compete with that. A third reason for the low costs is in the randomness of geology, which has dictated that the rare earths in China are easily extractable and separable, implying low processing costs. Finally, innovations in the field of chemistry has given an advantage. In China, operators were able to successfully transfer from the use of nitric acid to the much cheaper hydrochloric acid as a means of extracting the elements from their minerals.

Myth number 2
Myth number two that was presented by Mr. Karayannopoulos, conces the widely accepted idea that rare earths are irreplaceable in their various applications. Because of their unique characteristics, there are no substitutes at any price for REE in technology. Well, this world view is changing, and in a number of fields REE are being replaced as a logical consequence of input prices rising from say $3 per kg to $125 per kg over a two year time-span. In the cases where end-products are a commodity rather than a specialty, price prevails over performance, and substitution is a necessary development. Price-conscious producers are being forced to substitute with cheaper inputs that have acceptable poorer performance. A lot was said on what I would call the de-commoditization of rare earths during the conference, and I will come back on this in upcoming articles, as to me this presents the core of where rare earth markets are headed for the coming years.

Mr. Karayannopoulos then tued his attention to innovations focusing on efficiencies in terms of volume-reduction of the now high priced rare earths. Shin-Etsu, a large Japanese magnet producer, has focused on significantly reducing the input of dysprosium in their newest NdFeB sintered magnets, and have been able to engineer the hugely expensive terbium completely out of the magnet, apparently at no loss to performance. Rather than being a threat to the demand for rare earths, I view these kind of developments as a very natural part of innovation cycles, and is a driver of efficiencies. This is not reducing the need for rare earths, but rather structural shifts in the supply and demand parameters per separate element.

Market developments: lagging demand
According to Mr. Karayannopoulos, weakness will prevail in the non-Chinese demand for rare earths in the short to medium term. Japan’s Fukushima disaster has impacted all industrial production and therefore demand for these inputs. Japan, needless to say, constitutes a large part of demand for processed REE in concentrates, powders and alloys for their automotive and high-tech industries. Adding further to the depressed REE markets are the recent floods in Thailand, where most of Neo Material’s non-Chinese clients are situated. Hence, Mr. Karayannopoulos sees the FOB prices of dysprosium, cerium and lanthanum dropping further over the next couple of quarters.

Market developments: lower ROW demand will drive 2012 export quotas lower
Mr. Karayannopoulos estimates that total demand outside of China (ROW) amounts to roughly 40,000 tons REO per year. We know that 30,000 tons are covered by the quotas, implying the remaining 10,000 tons is presumably covered by smuggled ware. Given the fact that demand has slumped significantly, Mr. Karayannopoulos believes that despite the recent global outcry over diminishing Chinese export quotas the 2011 quotas will probably not be used up by weste manufacturers. This may lead China to subsequently further lower export quotas for 2012, which are bound to cause a new round of the usual China-bashing media reports.

Balance
Balance was a key word in Mr. Karayannopoulos’s presentation, and with it he means that with new non-Chinese REE projects coming on line over the next few years, a glut in one rare earth element can coexist with a screaming shortage in another. As you are probably aware, the average REE deposit is skewed towards larger volumes of what we call the light REE (LREE) whilst lesser volumes of heavy REE (HREE) are naturally produced. The relative rareness of the HREE, along with their unique characteristics, makes them largely irreplaceable, more sought after and more expensive. This makes the few deposits that contain large volumes of HREE similarly rare and valuable, and although current non-Chinese REE supply is tight across all the elements, the ramping up of the huge volumes of LREE production that Lynas and Molycorp envisage over the next few years makes Mr. Karayannopoulos very skeptical of the viability of any further projects that are focused on LREE. In fact, the less cerium and lanthanum a deposit contains and the more it contains large volumes of the elements with sustaining high demand and lasting supply constraints, the more likely the success rate of a project. Balance is the ability of a company’s production to match the elements in demand, and is crucial. Thus the inferred bottom line is that projects with a large HREE + neodymium distribution are more likely to succeed.

Next week we will get a little more technical as innovations in a number of REE-containing technologies are discussed.

Twitter: @GoldDiscFund
www.gdfund.com

 
Disclaimer: The author is a researcher for the Gold&Discovery Fund, and neither he nor the Gold&Discovery Fund has commercial ties to, or shares in, the companies reviewed, unless explicitly stated in the text. The information in this bulletin is the author’s independent opinion of developments in markets and at companies, and hence may contain factual errors, and may not reflect the opinions of the Gold&Discovery Fund. The content of this bulletin is not intended as an investment recommendation.

Copyright: The information in this bulletin can be forwarded, cited or used otherwise, but only within the context as intended by the author, and with complete reference to the source.

De exportquota's voor strategische metalen die verlaagd worden (de onderstaande metalen behoren niet allemaal tot de REEs):

Via de website van het Chinese ministerie van Handel worden we niet veel wijzer..

Bron: MOFCOM

Zilver
De export van Chinees zilver wordt met 5% verlaagd en komt neer op een verlaging van 283 ton. In 2011 was het exportquotum op 5.670 ton.  De Chinese import van zilver waarvan naar schatting 70% voor industrieel verbruik is, daalde dit jaar met 39%. Zilverexport vanuit China daalde ook. Die daalde met 44% naar 83,5 ton. Daarmee blijft China nog wel een netto importeur van zilver.  
 

Terence van der Hout                    

Oct 26 – Nov 5, 2011 Gold&Discovery Fund

Aims to update investors on developments in the world of strategy metals – crucial inputs to industry, defense and technology innovation

This week’s bulletin retus to its roots of providing short bursts of information on developments in the critical metals. Firstly, we see Alkane making progress with securing partners for its niobium production, we observe further tightening of the REE markets by China through an invoice system, we continue our rant on crashing prices as an argument for discontinuing REE production in China, and we regard the ratio between FOB and China domestic REE prices.

Alkane finds downstream partner for its niobium
Alkane, an Australian company developing a strategic metal deposit, has announced it has signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a European company to set up a joint venture (JV) which will use all of Alkane’s niobium production to manufacture ferro-niobium (FeNb) for application in the steel industry. Alkane plans to mine zirconium, niobium and REE in Australia, in 2014.

Niobium’s resistivity to high temperatures and to highly corrosive conditions makes it a perfect additive to steel in bridges and pipelines, and saves up to 10% of the weight of an average vehicle. I elaborated on the niobium market in SMB46, so I will not repeat all of that here.

What is important to realize is that Alkane has two possible production scenarios. The first is a 400,000 ton of ore per year (tpa) option, and the second envisages 1 mil tpa. Obviously, scenario two is preferred, as it enhances revenues and therefore profitability, but for that to materialize, it will need to find clients for all of its production of zirconium, niobium and REE. Having secured clientele for 50% of its zirconium in a non-binding MOU in July, this recent announcement ‘virtually guarantees’ the extended production scenario, as it locks up 100% of the niobium production. If Alkane can now secure clients for its REE, this would mean that the total production of REE Alkane will be putting onto the market on a yearly basis will amount to almost 6,500 tons. The main REE produced is yttrium, a heavy REE applied as colour phosphor in TV sets and LEDs. Alkane’s share will capture over 5% of the current REO market, and virtually all of the non-Chinese yttrium production, making for a very interesting source for Japanese and South Korean high-tech manufacturers. Alkane is continuing to prove it deserves a rightful place in the world of critical metals production.
 
China plans to introduce a new REE invoice system
In a further measure aimed at tightening Chinese REE production and materials available for export, Chinese industry actors have said the Chinese govement is planning to implement a new invoice system for the REE industry. The invoices will be launched in November by the govement aiming to further curb the illegal production of rare earths, as insiders believe the invoices will be linked to official production and export quotas. The invoices are used as an official stamp of approval for tax purposes, and the measure should officially eliminate the countless small scale illegal operations that currently do not fall under the REE quota systems.

The rant, part two
Last week’s rant, if you recall, was about the false argument of justifying Chinese production halts because of crashing REE prices within China. Well, the rant continues into this week.

In a 27th Oct article on Mineweb, a reputed website, an industry analyst was cited as saying “This month, the price of neodymium oxide declined 34% to $157 per kilogram, while europium oxide slid 35% to $2,904 per kilogram. All of this has shaken the industry in China”, and was the reason China is halting production at its largest REE mine, in October.

Well, according to the metal-pages data, there was no such 34 – 35% decline of the two elements over the month October. Neither was there such a decline a month earlier. As you can see below, europium dipped to a low in the beginning of September and is more or less flat since, whereas neodymium fell sharply in August and has shown moderate decline through to October. So where does that leave our analyst? Either metal-pages supplies incorrect data, or the analyst is hopelessly out of synch with the market. My conclusion remains – China is not halting REE production because of crashing domestic prices.

Ratios between FOB and China domestic prices
Just to add some completely unnecessary information to your already overloaded heads, I have tracked the ratio between Chinese domestic prices for light and heavy rare earths, and the FOB equivalents, over the past 9 months. This ratio is clearly finding a new equilibrium with prices much closer together now than two years ago.
 
 

As you can see, the average FOB price of LREE in January was 8 times more expensive  than the domestic price. This moved up to a ratio of 12:1 in March, and has come down to just over 3:1 this month. This has been due to the China domestic prices catching up with FOB at more elevated levels. For the HREE, the difference was less pronounced, and in fact, the FOB price of neodymium and dysprosium, the two elements that are most crucial for high performance magnets, is only 1.5 times higher than the China domestic price.

Twitter: @GoldDiscFund
www.gdfund.com

 
Disclaimer: The author is a researcher for the Gold&Discovery Fund, and neither he nor the Gold&Discovery Fund has commercial ties to, or shares in, the companies reviewed, unless explicitly stated in the text. The information in this bulletin is the author’s independent opinion of developments in markets and at companies, and hence may contain factual errors, and may not reflect the opinions of the Gold&Discovery Fund. The content of this bulletin is not intended as an investment recommendation.

Copyright: The information in this bulletin can be forwarded, cited or used otherwise, but only within the context as intended by the author, and with complete reference to the source.

Aims to update investors on developments in the world of strategy metals – crucial inputs to industry, defense and technology innovation

Terence van der Hout                    

Oct 16 – 22, 2011 Gold&Discovery Fund

This week’s bulletin is an all- rare earth affair, as we try to find Baotou Steel’s real motivation for suspension of REE production, and we look at progress at Lynas and Molycorp.

Why is Baotou suspending production of REE?
Topping the rare earth headlines this week is word that Chinese Baotou Steel is halting the processing of REE ore for a month. The report follows the suspension of activities at three smaller Chinese mining operations, a month earlier. Baotou Steel is a steel producer with huge iron mining operations. It also extracts 60% of the world supply of rare earths as a by-product, implying that the impact of its suspension decision is significant.

The official reason is that the measure will “stabilize the market and balance supply and demand.” This statement implies there is such a thing as a relationship between the price of REE, and its supply and demand fundamentals. Recent price falls of REE caused by lagging demands as a consequence of global economic downtu are cited as triggers, and the move is aimed at preventing a further plunge in prices by forcing a draw down on the inventory of traders. As a second measure, Baotou also plans to buy rare earths, which is another way of saying they will commence with the officially announced policy of stockpiling.

I am a little bit curious as to the timing of this measure. The chart above shows the price development of the separate rare earth elements, as they are sold in China, indexed per January (prices from metal-pages.com). These are the so-called China domestic prices, and the ones Baotou Steel will be monitoring very closely. As you can see, these prices peaked last July, declined for 2 months, but flattened as of the beginning of September. Some have even risen during the last month. Clearly, if prices within China are set by supply and demand (something we may legitimately question), demand isn’t crashing to any sort of bottom, and appears to be picking up. So why is Baotou seeking to correct a market not in need of further correcting? Is price stability really a true motivator for China, or is something else going on?

Well, Baotou’s actions should certainly be expected to influence the Chinese domestic rare earths prices. Holding back one month’s production by the world’s largest rare earth producer adds up to over 4% of global annual supply, which isn’t particularly large, but does send a very strong message the markets cannot ignore.

Is it in China’s interest to maintain higher domestic prices? Absolutely not. Local manufacturers of low-end magnets are ceasing production as a consequence of sharply risen costs. High domestic prices are unsustainable to production lines where manufacturers are having to charge consumers a doubling or tripling in prices to consumers.

However, pegging domestic prices does something else. There is a level of correlation between domestic prices and FOB prices. At the moment, LREE in China are roughly four times cheaper than they are on the export market, and HREE twice. Stopping the free-fall of the domestic prices is bound to halt the fall of FOB prices, albeit with a time lag, as there is somewhat of a disconnect between the rise and fall of the two sets of prices. And continued higher FOB prices keeps the manufacturing of high-end products containing REE unsustainably high for a longer period. I believe it is sustained high FOB prices that China is seeking.

If China can maintain high FOB prices (and therefore choke demand) for the time it takes for more manufacturers like Hitachi to move their sophisticated and proprietary (and sensitive) magnet making expertise to China, it may just raise enough of a barrier to prevent serious REE supply chains in the west to ever get established. China will have a lasting edge on the rest of the world for the application of technologies at the innovative frontier. Baotou’s action falls in line with other Chinese policies of export quota tightening and the crack-down on smuggling, all of which sends a powerful message that the only place you need to be if you are serious about manufacturing high-end goods containing REE is China. Now that is in China’s interest.

White knights
And what of the weste white knights? The two most serious non-Chinese contenders are following their separate paths. Lynas is experiencing increasing head winds in the form of Malaysian community protests against the import and processing of ore containing elevated levels of radiation. The latest set-back has been a rumour that Malaysian authorities were intent on refusing Lynas permission to import the ore from Australian for processing in Malaysia, a statement Lynas furiously denied, citing permission is not due for a couple of weeks. Lynas’ road to REE production has been as tough as it gets, and these latest developments may further prevent them from achieving their production timelines.
On the other end of the spectrum, Molycorp has announced they seek to accelerate the initial start-up of their processing facility. The pulling forward of production by three months will add 3,500 tons to Molycorp’s 2012 production. This is worth $114 million, clearly a drop in the pool of Molycorp’s vast financial resources. The additional 3,500 tons thus amount to roughly $31 per kg, which is a good reflection of the cost price Molycorp is prepared to pay to become the white knight saving the day.

Twitter: @GoldDiscFund
www.gdfund.com

 
Disclaimer: The author is a researcher for the Gold&Discovery Fund, and neither he nor the Gold&Discovery Fund has commercial ties to, or shares in, the companies reviewed, unless explicitly stated in the text. The information in this bulletin is the author’s independent opinion of developments in markets and at companies, and hence may contain factual errors, and may not reflect the opinions of the Gold&Discovery Fund. The content of this bulletin is not intended as an investment recommendation.

Copyright: The information in this bulletin can be forwarded, cited or used otherwise, but only within the context as intended by the author, and with complete reference to the source.

Aims to update investors on developments in the world of strategy metals – crucial inputs to industry, defense and technology innovation

Terence van der Hout

Oct 9 – 15, 2011

This week’s bulletin goes on a myth-busting tour, and takes a look at rare earth recycling initiatives, glances at Molycorp’s HREE semantics, and goes for another moon shot in titanium.

Recycling gains traction… sort of
As prices of rare earth elements careen upwards off the screen, manufacturers are trying to find ways of coping with much higher prices for inputs to their goods. For some, the price does not really affect the end product, because the relative value of the rare earths are so small compared to other inputs. For others, the five or ten-fold price rise of a few hundred grams takes huge chunks out of the margin of the end product, leading to decisions of whether to start forwarding this to the consumer, something most manufacturers are loath to do.

I have previously covered the story of TDK setting on the path to engineer rare earths out of some of their magnets as a strategy that seeks to substitute expensive inputs. As TDK itself admits, substitution is only possible for a small set of their products.

A second strategy that has been receiving a lot of recent air-time is recycling. Rhodia Group, based in France, supplies rare earth containing products for catalytic convertors, light bulbs, optics and flat screen TVs, and has embarked on a path of recycling REE from low-energy light bulbs and nickel hydride rechargeable batteries. Rhodia claims to already partner with companies recycling magnets (one of them being Umicore, in Hoboken,  Belgium), which will recover rare earth concentrate for Rhodia to refine and formulate. Apparently, two recycling facilities are currently under construction and will be operational in Q1 2012.

Rhodia claims the results of recycling should ‘ultimately’ account for several tens of percent of the group’s rare earth supply in the future, although the rare earths contained in the nickel hydride batteries only amount to 7% of the magnet. This 7% is subsequently made up of 4 separate rare earth elements, so the total recovered volume per magnet of for example dysprosium is miniscule. The same is apparent for light bulbs, containing terbium, ytrrium and europium, implying that huge amounts of recyclable material should be supplied in order for the volumes to be substantial. Although rechargeable batteries already exist in numbers, low-energy light bulbs do not, so that I would assume the word ‘ultimately’ to be defined in terms of decades.

In Japan, a similar project is being launched under the guidance of govement. The Tohoku region has been designated to become a hub for recovery of REE from cell phones and other electrical appliances. The technology to recover rare metals has yet to be fully developed, and the intention is to finance this through allocating a small percentage of profits from the sales of recovered metals for further development. This project also appears to require development time, and includes the broader term rare metal as opposed to rare earth,  leading me to conclude that recycling will not account for significant rare earth supply in the short to medium term.

Molycorp semantics
Molycorp has been spreading rumours of the ‘discovery’ of a heavy REE deposit on one of their properties. The rumour has kept the media and many commentators busy for a week, trying to figure out where the deposit is situated and why no one has known about it. To add spice to the story, Molycorp also claims they might be able to begin producing heavy rare earths in a little over a year. The story has done well to halt the rapid erosion of Molycorp‘s share price, immediately bouncing 20% higher.

As yet, no details have been revealed, and analysts have ridiculed the notion of being able to produce HREE within a year of their discovery. Again, the process from discovery to producing volumes of REE takes 10-15 years, and nothing has been disclosed about a project that has serious potential to materially affect the share price. So how do Molycorp’s wizards perform their magic?

Well, the answer is not so hard. Molycorp WILL be able to produce heavies next year. In fact, they can probably do it already. In their original 1967 flow sheet, processes were designed to produce ALL of the heavy rare earths, even the ones they haven’t included in their revised mining plans. In fact, Molycorp is capable of producing europium at 99.99% purity, and yttrium can also be produced at an undefined level of purity. Molycorp has spent recent  years redesigning their flow sheets at some expense, and it is conceivable they have also focused on the HREE. Will they be producing HREE from the latest ‘discovery’? The answer has to be no, if no previous work has been done there. But what  they can do is extract the small amount of heavies that even their LREE deposit at Mountain Pass contains, ét voilà, Molycorp now produces the heavies.
As with almost all of the reports coming out of the enigmatic Molycorp, the answer is in the semantics.

Another moon shot
We have had recent media reports of vast metal deposits in Afghanistan allegedly seen as the pillar for rebuilding a country ravaged by wars started by various advanced economies. We have heard of huge underwater tracts filled with rare metals supposedly ready to be scooped off the ocean floor and put in your cell phone or laptop. The latest round from the realm of fantasy is the notion of mining titanium on the moon. Clearly, ilmenite, which contains titanium, is abundant on the surface of the moon, and Trekkies are touting the mining of these minerals in an existential attempt to give new meaning to their lives and NASA after the US govement grounded the hugely expensive space exploration program, last July.

Although titanium markets are tight, and China is a major importer, the titanium market is large with diversified supply sources, and not necessarily as critical as a whole host of specialty metals. Titanium sponge, one of the forms of titanium traded on the market, is roughly $10 per kg, slightly more expensive than say copper. Not really worth going to the moon for.

Twitter: @GoldDiscFund
 
Disclaimer: The author is a researcher for the Gold&Discovery Fund, and neither he nor the Gold&Discovery Fund has commercial ties to, or shares in, the companies reviewed, unless explicitly stated in the text. The information in this bulletin is the author’s independent opinion of developments in markets and at companies, and hence may contain factual errors, and may not reflect the opinions of the Gold&Discovery Fund. The content of this bulletin is not intended as an investment recommendation.

Copyright: The information in this bulletin can be forwarded, cited or used otherwise, but only within the context as intended by the author, and with complete reference to the source.

De ontwikkelingen op de kopermarkt blijven de gemoederen bezig houden. China, dat goed is voor 40% van de wereldwijde vraag naar koper, ziet de voorraden afnemen. Verwacht wordt dat China de komende maanden meer koper moeten importeren om aan de vraag te kunnen voldoen. Goldman Sachs verwacht daarom ook dat in de komende 12 maanden de prijs – nu rond de $10.000 per ton – zal stijgen naar $11.000.

http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWUBKWG6Arhc

Maar niet alles is altijd wat het lijkt. Naast de instroom van geld in koper ETFs, is er misschien nog een andere reden waarom de vraag vanuit China toeneemt en waarom de koperprijs op ongekend hoge niveau's staat. Michael Pettis stelt dat Chinese bedrijven moeilijker aan financiering kunnen komen, en daarom het koper in het buitenland kopen en daar ook financieren. Vervolgens gebruiken zij het fysieke koper in China als onderpand om geld te kunnen lenen. Zo omzeilen Chinese bedrijven die krap bij kas zitten de strengere kredietvoorwaarden in China. Erg vindingrijk, maar als de koperprijs naar meer reële niveau's daalt dan kan het wel eens de nodige problemen opleveren.

http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/commodities/industrial-metals/the-copper-bubble-looks-set-to-burst-how-to-profit-12411

Ondanks de hoge olieprijzen hebben de OPEC lidstaten niet besloten de productie te verhogen. Iran, Venezuela en Algerije zouden hier een stokje voor hebben gestoken.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/us-opec-idUSTRE75715L20110608

De Wall Street Joual ziet in het mislukken van de besprekingen van de OPEC de spanningen tussen Iran en Saoedi-Arabië oplopen. De verwachting is dat de Saoedi's unilateraal zullen beslissen om de productie te verhogen, iets dat zij kunnen vanwege hun reservecapaciteit. Volgens een insider heeft deze bijeenkomst het einde ingeluid van het OPEC quota-systeem. 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304259304576373150163060100.html

De ontwikkelingen met OPEC komen op een wel zeer gespannen moment. De excessieve monetaire inflatie in Amerika, de stijging van de goudprijs en de relatie met olie , peak-oil, de aard van de termijnmarkten en de daarmee samenhangende speculatie, de politieke instabiliteit en de toenemende spanningen in het Midden-Oosten; al die zaken bij elkaar genomen zetten te denken. Wat de echte betekenis is zal moeten blijken; de onderstaande grafiek geeft de prijsontwikkeling van 1861-2010 en biedt daarmee een historische context voor de recente ontwikkelingen. 

In navolging van de Oekraïne heeft Rusland besloten om het exportverbod op graan op te heffen. Rusland heeft vanaf augustus 2010 geen graan geëxporteerd en zal de export vanaf 1 juli hervatten. Verwacht wordt dat de graanprijzen zullen afnemen omdat de schaarste op de wereldmarkt door het Russische en Oekraïense aanbod. Of de prijzen echt zullen dalen valt te bezien. De oogsten in Noord-Amerika en Europa vallen tegen en ook in China zijn de problemen groot; China kent de ergste droogte sinds 50 jaar. 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/8545225/Russia-to-help-wheat-prices-by-lifting-grain-export-ban.html

Michael Robinson van de BBC World Service maakte een radiodocumentaire over de vraag waarom de prijs van koper de laatste jaren is verdubbeld. Het bracht hem naar de Rotterdamse haven bij het nu nog zelfstandige opslagbedrijf Steinweg. Izabella Kaminska van de Financial Times luisterde naar het intrigerende radioverslag, waarin ook wordt ingegaan op het fenomeen van banken die opslagloodsen opkopen. Waarom willen banken loodsen verhuren? 

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/05/31/580436/lets-count-the-copper-with-dust-on-it/

Zonder dat het hardop gezegd wordt kopen banken loodsen op, om op die manier een informatie-voorsprong te behalen op andere partijen. Zij verkijgen hiermee immers meer informatie over daadwerkelijke voorraden en welke kant de markt op zal bewegen. Bovendien kunnen zij voorraden buiten de officiële statistieken houden, wat hen in staat stelt op papier een grotere schaarste te creëren. Hierdoor kunnen zij voor zichzelf gebruik maken van hogere prijzen. Gevolg hiervan is dat banken aanbod achter gaan houden in afwachting van hogere prijzen.  

http://www.spiegel.de/inteational/business/0,1518,724140,00.html

En dat hoge koperprijzen niet alleen in een Nederland tot diefstal leiden, blijkt uit het volgende bericht..

http://www.wtop.com/?nid=41&sid=239900